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NEUROLOGICAL PROGRESS

Severe Neurological Impairment:
Legal Aspects of Decisions to Reduce Care
H. kchard Beresford, MD, JD
Decisions to reduce care for patients with severe neurological impairment may raise legal questions. The laws of most
states now authorize physicians to stop care for those who have suffered irreversible cessation of all functions of the
brain (“brain death). Where state law is not explicit, it is nevertheless probably lawful to regard brain death as death
for legal purposes so long as currently accepted criteria are satisfied. Several courts have ruled that it is lawful to reduce
care for patients in vegetative states, but have prescribed differing standards and procedures for implementing such
decisions. The issue of whether parents can authorize physicians to reduce care for neurologically impaired children is
the focus of current litigation. Implicit in this litigation is the question of how severe neurological impairment must be
before parents and physicians may lawfully agree to reduce care. For severely impaired but not vegetative adults, there
is some legal authority to justify certain decisions to reduce care. The issue of whether withholding feeding from a
severely demented patient with life-threatening medical problems constitutes criminal behavior is now being considered by a state supreme court.
Beresford HR. Severe neurological impairment: legal aspects of decisions to reduce care.
Ann Neurol 15:409-414, 1984
Decisions to reduce care for patients suffering from
severe neurological impairment may present difficult
ethical and legal problems. Courts that have ruled on
the lawfulness of these decisions have had little guidance from legislation or judicial precedent. But despite
sharp debate about some rulings, a rough judicial consensus has emerged. It can be stated as follows: If
physicians have determined that a patient has no
reasonable prospect of attaining cognitive or other
nonvegetative functions of the brain, and if physicians
and the patient’s informed legal representatives agree
that reducing care is proper, then life-sustaining care
may lawfully be withdrawn or withheld. There is no
such consensus about what is lawful for less severely
impaired patients, nor is there broad general agreement on what procedures must be followed to validate
decisions to reduce care. This review considers
neurological impairments that may justify reducing
care, and discusses the impact of law on how decisions
to reduce care are implemented.

Neurological Impairments That May Justify
Reducing Care
Brain Death
The view that death of the brain is the equivalent of the
death of the person has slowly gained acceptance. A
majority of state legislatures and several courts in states
without legislation on the subject have declared that,
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for legal purposes, an irreversible loss of all brain functions constitutes death 128, 351. In these states, a medical determination that generally accepted criteria of
brain death have been met readily justifies stopping all
forms of care. Even when the family of a patient desires
that treatment continue until cardiac function ceases, a
physician may elect to stop treatment. An Illinois appellate court has recently decided that physicians are
entitled to remove a patient from a respirator once they
have diagnosed brain death and may disregard a family’s wishes that it be maintained until cardiac arrest
occurs 1261.
In states with neither legislation nor an explicit judicial ruling, it is probably legally justifiable to stop care
on diagnosis of brain death. The common law principle
that death occurs when a competent physician diagnoses it would seem to apply. Thus, in a recent appellate decision in New York (which has no brain death
legislation) the court upheld a jury’s finding that a criminal defendant who had caused medically diagnosed
brain death was guilty of manslaughter {34}. When a
physician is concerned about the lack of an explicit law
or ruling on brain death, he or she may seek approval
for a decision to stop care from a hospital review body.
If it seems likely that the decision will provoke legal
controversy, obtaining a court order is prudent.
Regardless of state law, the essential question concerning brain death is whether generally accepted medical criteria have been fully satisfied. In litigation about
Received Dec 19, 1983. Accepted for publication Dec 25, 1983

brain death, disputes have centered on the adequacy of
the testing that led to the diagnosis. For example, in
homicide prosecutions defendants have asserted that
the physicians who allegedly misdiagnosed brain death
in fact killed the victims by removing them from respirators [34, 431. Although this tactic has failed, its use
highlights the importance of documenting both the criteria used for diagnosing brain death and the results of
testing (including a description of the methods and results of testing for apnea) [34}.

Vegetative States
The widely publicized Quinlan case [23] involved a
young woman who had been vegetative for many
months following treatment of an acute encephalopathy of undefined cause. Her examining physicians all
agreed that there was little hope for neurological recovery. After the family learned of this grim prognosis, her
father sought, against her physician’s objections, to
have her removed from a respirator. Although medical
testimony at the trial indicated that she would not
necessarily die if the respirator were removed [22), the
focus of the litigation was on her “right to die.” The
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately determined that
she had such a right, that it was of constitutional dimensions, and that her father could exercise it on her behalf. Since the Quinlan decision, courts in Delaware
[42), New York [28}, Ohio [25}, and Washington [271
have decided that patients in chronic vegetative states
have a constitutional or common law right to the withdrawal of respirators or other life-sustaining measures.
The patient in the Ohio case also had incapacitating
motor neuron disease at the time of the cardiac arrest
that left her in a vegetative state.
A recent ruling by a California appellate court {4] is
particularly noteworthy because it involved an unprecedented criminal prosecution of physicians. At issue
was the lawfulness of withdrawing care from a man who
had sustained severe brain injury from a cardiac arrest
during elective surgery. After a neurological consultation, his two physicians informed his family that he had
a poor prognosis for neurological recovery, and on authorization from the family removed him from a respirator. When the patient did not die, fluid and nutritional therapy were withheld. He died several days
later. Autopsy findings included diffuse and multifocal
encephalomalacia, dehydration, and pneumonia.
At a preliminary hearing before a magistrate, all
medical witnesses agreed that the patient had sustained
substantial brain damage before any treatment was
withheld. However, the prosecution’s medical experts
indicated that there was some uncertainty about the
degree of recovery of neurological functions that
would have been possible if the patient had received
maximal treatment. The magistrate nonetheless found
no “probable cause” for prosecuting the physicians, and
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dismissed charges of murder and conspiracy to commit
murder {32}.
A superior court judge reinstated the charges {331,
but they were then dismissed by a district appellate
court {4].It adopted an “omission” theory of homicide,
under which a physician could be found guilty for failing to perform a duty to a particular patient if the
omission caused the patient’s death. The court interpreted the medical evidence to indicate that the patient
“had suffered severe brain damage, leaving him in a
vegetative state, which was likely to be permanent.”
For such a patient the court found no duty to continue
what was likely to be ineffective treatment, even if the
physician knew that withholding treatment would
cause his death. In other words, the court seems to be
saying that physicians have no legal duty to sustain the
lives of irreversibly vegetative patients. The prosecution announced that it would not take an appeal to the
state’s highest court, leaving uncertain the weight of
this case as a precedent in other courts in California #or
elsewhere.
Several courts have thus decided that the law does
not require physicians to prolong the lives of hopelessly vegetative patients. Where they have differed is
on what procedures must be followed before care is
actually reduced. For example, the Quinlan decision
[23] would require that a hospital committee review
the medical determination of prognosis before lifesupporting measures are withdrawn, while the Storar
decision 1283 indicates that if there is “clear and convincing” evidence that the neurological prognosis is
hopeless and that reducing care would accord with the
patient’s wishes, care may be reduced without further
oversight or review.
These nuances aside, the matter that most concerns
the physician is the reliability of the determination that
one who is in a vegetative state will remain that way.
Law does not require absolute or statistical certainty
before a prognosis is deemed acceptable as a basis for
decision making. But the specific level of certainty required is not clear. Courts generally will accept into
evidence an opinion based on “reasonable medical certainty” or some similar standard C91. Then they weigh
the opinions and decide what effect to give them. If a
physician’s determination of a hopeless prognosis is
based upon a careful neurological examination, a review of published relevant studies, and consultation
with those who may be more knowledgeable or experienced, then such a prognosis can be offered with “reasonable medical certainty” and may serve as legal
justification for reducing care for a vegetative patient.

Congenital Encepbalopathies
Each year substantial numbers of children are born
with neurological impairments. These vary in severity
and their full extent may not be appreciated for many

*

years. While some of these children may be classified as
vegetative, more commonly they have diminished cognitive or neocortical functions and are labeled as mentally retarded. They may or may not have other
neurological impairments, skeletal deformities, or
anomalies in other systems. When severe impairments
are present and parents and physicians agree that the
outlook for a life of reasonable quality (however that
term is defined) for the child is bleak, physicians have
withheld life-supporting care { I , 111.
Actions of this nature have not, until recently, been
subjects of much legal inquiry. One explanation is the
law’s presumption that parents act in the best interests
of their children [lb, 361. From this has followed the
view that the state, through the operation of its legal
institutions, should not interfere in decisions parents
make with respect to the medical care of their children.
The state may intervene only if it can establish, usually in the context of neglect or child abuse proceedings, that parental conduct clearly threatens the welfare
of a child. Thus, a New York court ordered surgery for
an infant with meningomyelocele after finding that the
parents’ rejection of surgery constituted “neglect,”
since the child might expect a “relatively normal life”
after surgery {2). Similarly, a Massachusetts court ordered chemotherapy for a child with a curable form of
leukemia over the parents’ objections, since the medical evidence was that the child would certainly die
without treatment [lo]. But a New York court found
no parental neglect in the case of a child with Hodgkin’s disease whose parents had rejected conventional
therapy and chosen a licensed physician who prescribed laetrile and “metabolic therapy” [27). This last
decision illustrates the power of the legal presumption
that parents act for the good of their children.
The federal government has recently sought to constrain decisions by parents and physicians to reduce
care for children with neurological and other impairments. Its approach has been to interpret certain federal statutes [8, 391 that provide for financial support to
health care institutions as forbidding decisions that
either “discriminate” against handicapped children or
amount to child abuse. While the statutes themselves
do not expressly forbid parents from choosing to reduce or withhold care from their children, regulations
proposed under these laws empower the government
to withdraw funding from hospitals or other health care
institutions that tolerate allegedly discriminatory or
abusive care f l 3 , 14, 151. The threat of this sanction
presumably would cause health care institutions to ensure compliance with federal standards for the care of
children.
The government’s first major effort in this direction
was thwarted. The Department of Health and Human
Services proposed regulations, under a federal rehabilitation statute 1391, that declared that the statute is vio-

lated when treatment is withheld from a neurologically
or otherwise handicapped child solely because of the
child’s handicap 187. The regulations required health
care institutions to post notices stating that “discriminatory denial of food or customary medical care” to handicapped children is unlawful, and established a “hotline” procedure for reporting suspected violations that
would then trigger federal investigations. A federal
court invalidated these regulations because they had
been issued without prior public notice or opportunity
for affected parties to comment, as required by a federal administrative procedure act [ 13. New regulations
were promptly proposed, this time allowing for public
comment, but they have not yet been finalized [ 151.
New York‘s highest court recently barred a private
citizen, unrelated to the parents or health care providers, from obtaining a court order requiring lifeprolonging surgery for a newborn with severe
neurological impairments 1461. The court held that
only the state child protective service or a person authorized by a court had the standing to seek such an
order. The federal government then sought to obtain
the child’s medical records to determine if the child had
been the subject of “discrimination.” A federal district
judge denied this request 1441, finding that there was
no evidence of discrimination. The government has
appealed this ruling.
Other Conditions
There are two other broadly defined groups of
neurologically impaired patients for whom reductions
in care may be considered. One consists of persons
who are neither comatose nor vegetative but who have
severe, irreversible neurological impairment and are
incapable of making decisions for themselves. An example is a person in the late stages of Alzheimer’s
disease. The other group consists of persons who are
neurologically impaired but whose cognitive functions
are intact enough to enable them to decide for themselves how much care they prefer. An example is a
person with incapacitating motor neuron disease or
with quadriplegia after a cervical spinal cord injury. In
the legal sense, persons in the first group are incompetent; those in the second group are competent.
There is limited judicial support for permitting physicians to reduce care for certain incompetent nonvegetative patients. An intermediate appellate court in
Massachusetts held that an order not to resuscitate an
elderly patient with Alzheimer’s disease and diffuse
cardiovascular disease did not require prior judicial approval if attending physicians and family agreed that
the order was appropriate 1203. This finding harmonizes with the view of the California court in the
Barber case {4] that law does not impose on physicians
a duty to sustain life in all neurologically impaired patients. By contrast, an intermediate appellate court in
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New Jersey recently reversed a lower court’s permissive ruling [lS] and suggested that removal of a feeding
tube from a severely demented but not vegetative
woman with life-threatening medical problems might
constitute a criminal homicide 1171. An appeal of this
decision to the New Jersey Supreme Court is pending.
New York‘s highest court ruled, in the Storar litigation
1281, that the mother of an incompetent adult was not
empowered to prevent his receiving blood transfusions, even though he was terminally ill with metastatic
cancer. His physicians believed that the transfusions
made him more comfortable.
As a general legal principle, all persons possess a
right to refuse medical treatment, even if they will die
or suffer great harm as a consequence 121, 24, 30,411.
Indeed, courts have invoked this right as the basis for
permitting surrogates to choose to reduce care for
neurologically impaired incompetent patients 16, 23,
291. It would seem to follow, therefore, that a physician has no legal duty to coerce a competent neurologically impaired patient into receiving life-sustaining or
other treatment and does not risk civil or criminal liability by acceding to an informed patient’s unequivocal
refusal of treatment. Moreover, forcing treatment
might constitute assault and battery 117).

Implementing Decisions to Reduce Care
Once a physician has diagnosed a neurological impairment that may justify reducing care, the question
whether and how to accomplish this will arise. Most
states now have neither authorizing legislation nor a
pertinent judicial decision. Current “living will” and
related laws 137, 38) offer a basis for reducing the care
of those few patients who qualify under the terms of
the statutes, but do not resolve the problem of the
patient who sustained severe neurological incapacity
before any consideration was given to reducing care. In a
few states (e.g., New Jersey, Massachusetts, Delaware,
Ohio, and New York), judicial decisions (6, 25, 28, 29,
4 2 ) offer guidance on how to proceed, particularly for
the physician who desires advance assurance that a decision to reduce care will not trigger a legal imbroglio.
If there is no such guidance, the physician is left with a
choice among abandoning any thoughts of reducing
care, acting in accordance with perceived medical
norms, or seeking formal institutional approval of a
decision to reduce care. The following sections describe some “models” for decision making, derived
from recent judicial decisions.
Traditional Medical Model
Testimony of physicians in the Quinkzn case portrayed
a medical tradition of adjusting levels of care to fit the
condition of hopelessly ill patients 122, 231. This includes withholding life-prolonging treatment when the
only effect of treatment is to extend a life of great
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misery or incapacity. Decisions of this nature are arrived at slowly and are implemented only after extensive discussions with the closest available members of a
patient’s family. While medical consultations are sought
to assure reliability of diagnosis and prognosis, the participation of persons other than family and attending
physicians is not invited. Because the process is informal and nonlegalistic, the physician has no express
guarantee that he or she is invulnerable to later legal
attack.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its Quinlan
opinion (231, questioned the traditional model. The
court considered that physicians have become so
preoccupied with defensive concerns that they cannot
make decisions in the best interests of patients. Thus,
the court was unwilling to leave to Quinlan’s attending
physicians full discretion to decide whether or not to
continue a presumptively life-supporting respirator.
The physicians had opted to continue life support in
the face of a dismal neurological prognosis, but the
court thought that this treatment violated her “right to
die.” The attitude of the New Jersey court may bespeak a more general societal reluctance to allow physicians and families to make unsupervised decisions
about levels of care for neurologically impaired patients. The court did not cite any data showing that the
traditional medical model has led to a systematic disregard of the interests of patients, and to this author’s
knowledge no such data are available. Nevertheless,
Quinlan and subsequent rulings reflect a judicial plush
toward a more structured decision-making process
r3 11.
Substituted Judgment Models
INSTITUTIONALREVIEW. To protect what it deemed
a constitutional right to decline life-prolonging care,
the New Jersey court in Qain/an prescribed a decisionmakmg process that allows for a joint decision by physician, family, and a hospital committee [23].Thus, if a
physician determines that a neurologically impaired patient has “no reasonable possibility of regaining cognition or sapience,” and a hospital committee agrees with
this determination, a duly informed family member
may act for the patient and authorize the physician to
withdraw life-supporting measures. If this procedure is
followed, none of the participants in the decision is
subject to civil or criminal liability. Language in the
Quinlan decision suggests that the hospital commit tee
might consider ethical aspects of the decision to reduce
care. But the overall tenor of the court’s opinion is t-hat
the committee’s function is to verify the neurological
prognosis, not engage in a debate on the ethics of reducing care. The Washington Supreme Court has approved a similar procedure, envisioning that the committee (“prognosis board”) will have a circumscribed
role C271. A presidential commission has also recom-

mended a procedure that includes an institutional review mechanism [36].
In a ruling by which it authorized
caretakers of an incompetent adult to withhold treatment for an invariably fatal but perhaps briefly controllable leukemia, the highest court of Massachusetts indicated that all decisions to withhold life-sustaining
treatment from incompetent patients should be reviewed by a court 161. Under the proposed procedure,
a probate judge appoints a guardian ad litem for the
patient, who investigates what form of treatment is in
the “best interests” of the patient. The guardian then
makes a report to the probate court and includes all
arguments for continuing care. If the guardian recommends against life-prolonging treatment, then treatment can be withheld if, but only if, the probate judge
concurs. The Delaware Supreme Court has proposed a
similar approach 142). The asserted benefits of a judicial role are assurance of an adequate investigation of
the medical facts and an “objective” decision [ S ] . The
implication is that a less formalistic approach may result
in abuses of the interests of helpless persons, a notion
that has evoked rather heated debates 15, 401.

is arguably no legally enforceable duty to sustain
vegetative functions, whether or not the patient’s preferences are known.

JUDICIAL REVIEW.

In its Storar decision 1281, New
York‘s highest court rejected the doctrine of substituted judgment as a basis for decision making. In two
companion cases, the court approved removal of a respirator from a vegetative patient who, before the event
causing his brain injury, had clearly expressed a wish
not to have his life prolonged if he were ever so
afflicted, but refused to order stopping of blood transfusions for a terminally ill and profoundly retarded cancer patient whose preferences were unknowable. The
thrust of these rulings is that there must be proof that
the patient would want care reduced and that this proof
cannot be supplied by the preferences of those purporting to act for the patient, be they physicians, family
members, committees, or judges. Proof of the patient’s
preferences must be “clear and convincing.” One form
of proof is a carefully drawn “living will” or analogous
document, but oral statements by the patient were accepted as meeting this standard in Storar.
The obvious limitation of this model is that it fails to
cover the vegetative or otherwise severely impaired
patient who has not previously expressed a preference
but whose caretakers all agree on the appropriateness
of reducing care. In other words, protecting the autonomy of the patient may result in what many would view
as inhumane or extravagant applications of medical
technology. While there is no certain resolution to this
dilemma, courts have concluded that a physician is not
duty-bound to sustain life in all hopelessly ill, severely
impaired patients 14, 23, 291. Thus, if a physician determines that a patient is irreversibly vegetative, there

AUTONOMY MODEL.

j

Future Directions
Legislative
The goals of preserving the autonomy of patients and
protecting caretakers who try to act in the patient’s best
interests may perhaps be accomplished by legislation.
One approach is a “living will” statute that authorizes
physicians to reduce care in accordance with patients’
previously declared wishes and affords legal protection
to physicians who follow these directions. Several
states have such laws 1371, but their practical usefulness
is uncertain, partly because of restrictive coverage or
confusing draftsmanship 1121. Another approach is a
statute that authorizes any competent person to empower a designated family member or legal representative to consent to reduction of care in specified circumstances [38). Virginia has recently enacted such a law
1451. Finally, legislation might simply make physicians
immune from civil or criminal liability if their decisions
to reduce care are made in good faith and in accordance
with accepted standards of medical practice 171. This
approach recognizes both the fiduciary aspects of the
physician’s role and the need to comply with evolving
professional standards (including duties to make careful
diagnoses and prognoses, to obtain “informed consent”
where possible, and to employ only those treatments
appropriate to a patient’s condition).

Jzldicial
Whatever legislative developments occur, courts will
remain active in this area. It may take several years
before there is enough legislation to provide clear guidance on decisions to reduce care, and the legislation
itself will undoubtedly require judicial interpretation in
particular cases. Furthermore, the ethical, moral, and
political issues inherent in decisions to reduce care are
so sensitive that tidy legislative solutions are improbable. Thus, courts will continue to define on a case-bycase basis when reducing care is lawful and how the
decisions must be reached. In this regard, two pending
cases are of special interest. One is In re Conroy Cl91,
now on appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court. At
issue is whether it is lawful to withhold feeding from an
aged patient with severe untreatable dementia and major medical problems. The other is the “Baby Jane
Doe” litigation [44, 461. At issue here is the scope of
the federal government’s power to constrain decisions
to withhold care by parents and physicians of neurologically impaired children. This case is now before a federal appeals court.

Addendum
Following submission of this article, the Department of
Health and Human Services issued its new “Baby Doc”regu-
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lations (Nondiscrimination o n the Basis of Handicap; Procedures and Guidelines Relating t o Health Care for Handicapped Infants. Federal Register 49:1622, Jan 1984). These
are less intrusive than the initial proposed regulations and
seek t o encourage hospitals to establish their o w n review
procedures. The potential for federal investigations of alleged
noncompliance remains, however.
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